ABSTRACT
It was explained in Chapter 1 that weak powers engaged in bargaining processes with great powers use one or more of the following three tactics to achieve their objectives: alignment; brinkmanship; and participation in international regimes. Weak powers can decide to balance the great power through soft or hard balancing with another great power or to bandwagon with the threatening great power. Furthermore, they can also take the decision to engage in brinkmanship of various kinds and at various levels of threat. Finally, weak powers may choose to participate in international regimes or to shun them. Decisions made regarding which combination of these bargaining tactics to
use result from what weak powers learn about the factors which directly or indirectly affect the bargaining process, as well as from fluctuations in those factors. Hence, if the relative power of the great power involved in the bargaining process declines with respect to another great power, we would expect the weak power to balance with the help of that other great power. Also, if the asymmetries inherent within a great power-weak power conflict are reduced, we would assume that the weak power will engage in or increase the intensity of its brinkmanship. Similarly, if a change in the rules or expectations of an international regime makes it more agreeable to a weak power, we would expect the weak power to become more involved in that regime. Certainly, great powers bargaining with weak powers also learn during the
bargaining process. Consequently, great powers also modify their behaviour as a result of the characteristics of those structures and fluctuations that occur within them. However, weak powers normally learn about those structures more accurately and rapidly and modify their behaviour accordingly. The main reason why weak powers are able to act more quickly is their greater relative interest in the outcome of the bargaining process. Whereas a great power is expected to become involved in the resolution of a seemingly everexpanding number of international issues, the weak power can concentrate on achieving the goals that will result from engagement in a small number of
matters that are central to its interests. Furthermore, the weak power usually has a greater commitment to achieving those goals. A bargaining process with a weak power and the goals to be achieved may be secondary to a great power, but this is rarely true in the case of weak powers bargaining with great powers. The cognitive structure of a weak power obviously affects its learning.
Every actor has a series of beliefs about the international system and a particular bargaining process, as well as with regard to the dynamics which shape and produce changes in them. These beliefs affect an actor’s attitudes towards other actors, shaping its behaviour. Since most actors prefer to maintain a cognitive structure owing to the stability this brings, learning is hindered by a quasi-natural tendency not to modify beliefs. A big shift in the structure of the bargaining process will be perceived by the actor through the lenses of its cognitive system. Consequently, the actor might not modify its choice of bargaining tactics immediately or might not even change it at all. Similarly, the beliefs of an actor concerning both its opponent in a bar-
gaining process and the behaviour of the opponent in the process itself influence the actor’s choice of tactics. Its behaviour is affected by its expectations about how the opponent will behave. Hence, when a change concomitant to the bargaining process takes place, such as the modification in the opponent’s behaviour or approach to the process (see above), the actor’s learning of the change will not be immediate. Owing to an actor’s tendency not to modify its cognitive structure, learning will be slowed down. As a result, a change in the choice of bargaining tactics may only be gradual or may not even occur. The limits imposed by competency traps are a second factor that hinder
proper learning by weak powers. When an actor becomes accustomed to a set of behavioural patterns that have proved successful in the past, there is a tendency for the actor to employ them when facing similar – and even dissimilar – situations. Actors are usually unwilling to modify their choice of bargaining tactics, since familiarity with the old set of tactics fosters competency in its use. Hence, competency traps delay proper learning because the actor is reluctant to search for new alternatives which may produce better results. Instead, an actor prefers to rely on a structure which was suitable in the past and with which it is familiar. Competency traps may even prevent learning if they are embedded in an actor’s psychology to the point where it is unable to recognize possible alternatives. This book has described how North Korea’s choice of tactics to bargain
with the USA has been in constant evolution since the beginning of the Clinton administration until the death of Kim Jong Il. Chapters 4 and 5 have shown how the goal that North Korea wanted to achieve through the bargaining process was slightly modified. Since 1974 the normalization of bilateral diplomatic relations has been North Korea’s ultimate goal. However, Pyongyang’s commitment to this objective decreased after it conducted a nuclear test in October 2006. Its commitment to normalization has become more ambiguous since a second test took place in May 2009.
