Introduction

The foreign policy behaviour of North Korea is one of the most intriguing, captivating and sometimes frustrating aspects of global politics in general and of the international relations of East Asia in particular. A hereditary communist dictatorship, one of the largest standing armies in the world, a stagnant economy, a Confucian mentality, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and, of course, nuclear capability make it a unique country. Its location in the middle of one of the most economically successful and dynamic regions in the world, which is also home to two countries in possession of nuclear weapons, and where the only current superpower, the USA, retains a large military presence, confer North Koreawith strategic importance due to its mere existence. Its involvement in the proliferation of WMD and nuclear materials, links with several Middle Eastern governments, and a continuous ability to resist diplomatic and economic pressure from the USA make North Korea relevant at the global level as a result of its behaviour. The fact that North Korea has proved to be one of the most impenetrable countries in the world for academics, journalists and intelligence officials alike has served to create a certain mystique around it. Much has already been written about North Korea. In the 1990s one of the

most prominent debates revolved around the possibility of a North Korean collapse (Eberstadt 1999: 228, 234-5; Foster-Carter 1998; Noland 1997; Oh 1999). Communist regimes were crumbling around the world, leading to an assumption by some that Pyongyang would follow suit. However, North Korea did not collapse, and Kim Jong Il replaced his father, Kim Il Sung, as supreme leader of the country in 1994, following the decease of the latter. With the younger Kim firmly in power, much of the literature from the early 2000s onwards focused on North Korea’s international relations. Some authors concentrated on describing North Korea’s relations with countries in North-East Asia as well as with the USA (Joo and Kwak 2007; Yongho Kim 2011; Kwak and Joo 2009; Rechter 2009). Others looked at US foreign policy towards North Korea. Authors tended to be divided into two different camps: those who prescribed engagement with North Korea to re-integrate the country into the international system (Cha and Kang 2003; Fuqua 2007; Wit 2007), and those who advocated putting pressure on Pyongyang to induce a change in its foreign policy or even regime change (Bechtol 2007). In contrast,

some scholars tried to shed light on the inner workings of the Kim Jong Il government (Byman and Lind 2010; Kihl and Kim 2006; Sung Chull Kim 2006; Lim 2009; Paik and Cheong 2008). The only point in common among all authors who have published meticulous studies of North Korea over the past decade is the belief that it is not an irrational actor. North Korea’s behaviour can therefore be studied and, to some extent, understood. This bookwill analyze North Korea’s foreign policy towards the USA from the

point when Bill Clinton became the 42nd US president to the death of Kim Jong Il, which took place during the presidency of Barack Obama. Shortly after Clinton’s inauguration, the first North Korean nuclear crisis began. A second nuclear crisis took place during the presidency of George W. Bush. Meanwhile, Obama is the first US president to be forced to deal with a nuclear North Korea from the very start of his term of office. During this period, the People’s Republic of China has emerged as the second largest economy in the world and as the central player in the regional politics of East Asia. Concurrently, Japan, Russia and South Korea have all become more involved in North-East Asian international relations. Therefore, this volume examines how Pyongyang’s policy towards Washington has evolved throughout a period characterized by the administrations of three successive US presidents and the changing power dynamics in North-East Asia. The book will highlight the key drivers of Pyongyang’s policy towards Washington from the early 1990s onwards. It will also expound the main continuities and changes in this policy, explaining the tools that North Korea has been using to try to achieve its objectives. The volume will also explain how and why Pyongyang’s behaviour towards Washington has shifted in response to the USA’s changing policies, and to the actions of other countries in North-East Asia and the dynamics of the international system.