ABSTRACT
Heidegger has arrived at the characterization of an authentic freedom towards death that he describes as an existential projection of an ontological possibility. But, suddenly, in what might be seen as a Kierkegaardian pang of intellectual conscience, he wonders whether all of this might, 'from an existentiell point of view' seem to be 'a fantastical exaction'. The speed and confidence of Heidegger's move from a consideration of being-towards-death to the question of conscience might lead us to overlook some surprising elements in what he is asking us to accept. The problem, we recall, is how to find an existentiell attestation to an authentic comportment vis-a-vis death. Very much like Heidegger Kierkegaard insists that the only way to talk appropriately about death is to do so in such a way as to keep one's own death in view.
