ABSTRACT
In The Concept of Anxiety Vigilius Haufniensis tells us that while anxiety's object is 'nothing', and this has various interrelated meanings including not something definite, not understanding sinfulness, and the nothing that pertains to one's being able, anxiety's relation to the 'nothing' is ambiguous: the relation of anxiety to its object, to something that is nothing is altogether ambiguous. This chapter interprets the anxiety in Being and Time through Haufniensis lenses. That is, it shows that Heidegger's anxiety is ambiguous in that it is structurally constituted by an antipathetic and sympathetic aspect, relating to 'nothing', and further, that these aspects continually entwine in elasticity. Heidegger's anxiety is constituted by a 'sympathetic antipathy ' and an 'antipathetic sympathy', and further, these 'dialectical determinations' are simultaneous, for each 'lens' indeed has the disclosure of the other in its periphery.
