ABSTRACT
So far, we have maintained that ‘sensations’ are neither private (Chapter 1) nor do we need a private language to express them (Chapter 2). In this chapter, I utilise these conclusions to show that self-knowledge, or the knowledge of one’s own mind, is attained neither by introspection, nor through any other ‘method’ to which the owner has a privileged access, but that it is gained by and through the knowledge of the world, or the total form of life. In this respect I have sharply departed from Ryle’s view that one knows about one’s own self, or mind, by observing one’s own behaviour and the like. To establish my thesis that one does not use any criterion to know about one’s own mind, or self, I have done two things: One: I have examined and rejected some of the major theories about the nature of mind and connected with it the introspection theory of self-knowledge. Two: I have discussed the nature of personal identity. In the main I have rejected the theories advocating the memory and bodily criteria of personal identity respectively. I have argued for the the sis that we need not have any special theories to account for first person personal identity judgements; one who considers that selfknowledge and personal identity present a problem is mistaken, for he fails to recognise that it is a basic feature of our life that we know about ourselves and about our identity without any theories.
