As noted throughout the previous chapters, our understanding of cybercrime is growing and provides some direction for theory and policymakers. The literature on oﬀending and victimization provides some consistent ﬁndings regarding the nature of cybercrime, but calls into question how we may more eﬀectively deter oﬀenders and insulate victims from risk. The behavioral, attitudinal, and demographic correlates of oﬀending and victimization identiﬁed in the existing literature can provide substantive direction for crimeprevention techniques (Clarke, 1983; Cornish & Clarke, 1987, 2003). In fact, the implications of these studies may be used to help inform situational crimeprevention frameworks for cybercrime (Collins, Sainato, & Khey, 2011; Hinduja & Kooi, 2013; Newman & Clarke, 2003). This criminological perspective combines rational choice theory along with routine activities perspectives (Clarke & Felson, 1993; Cohen & Felson, 1979), crime pattern theories (Spelman & Eck, 1989), and the problem analysis triangle (Braga, 2002), to help shape problem-oriented policing strategies (Braga, 2002; Clarke & Eck, 2007). As noted in Chapter 3, situational crime prevention views oﬀenders as
active thinkers who make choices to engage in crime based on their assessment of perceived risks, potential rewards, and situational factors such as environmental cues (Cornish & Clarke, 1987, 2003). Situational crime prevention focuses on ﬁve categories designed to impact both oﬀenders and victims by identifying strategies that directly inﬂuence opportunities to oﬀend by: (1) making it more challenging to engage in crime; (2) increase the risk of
detection; (3) reduce the rewards that may result from oﬀending; (4) reduce provocations to oﬀend; and (5) remove excuses for oﬀending (Clarke, 1983, 1995, 1997; Cornish & Clarke, 2003). Within each category, there are ﬁve techniques that can be applied to aﬀect the likelihood of crime, such as target hardening to increase the eﬀort oﬀenders must exert, using place managers to increase the risk of detection, concealing targets to reduce the potential rewards of oﬀending, and posting clear rules for behavior to remove excuses for criminality (Cornish & Clarke, 2003). From this perspective, oﬀenders may reduce their overall criminal behavior as a function of a perceived cumulative fear of apprehension, minimized conditions or opportunities to oﬀend, or decreased rewards resulting from oﬀending. There is generally little empirical research applying situational crime pre-
vention (SCP) to diﬀerent forms of cybercrime. Most of these studies utilize aspects of SCP to examine a speciﬁc crime type (e.g. Collins et al., 2011; Khey & Sainato, 2013) or provide summary overviews of existing knowledge within an SCP framework (e.g. Hinduja & Kooi, 2013; Rege, 2013). There is, however, a substantial literature on cybercrime oﬀending and prevention from both criminological and computer science research. This chapter will provide a synthesis of the current research literature on
preventing cybercrime from a situational crime prevention perspective. We focus primarily on acts of cyber-trespass and deception/theft as they have generated the largest overall body of research on why individuals commit these oﬀenses and attempts to minimize the likelihood of victimization. Using these oﬀenses, we ﬁrst discuss diﬀerences in the landscape of threats to
corporations and organizations relative to individuals. We then consider the empirical research on cybercrimes using four of the ﬁve categories of techniques of situational crime prevention: (1) increasing the diﬃculty of oﬀending; (2) increasing risks of oﬀending; (3) mechanisms to reduce rewards of involvement in cybercrime; and (4) removing excuses for oﬀenders and victims. This is not meant to be a completely comprehensive analysis of all 25 techniques of crime prevention, but rather a survey of the current state of research. In fact, we do not consider techniques to reduce provocations for involvement in cybercrime as our understanding of some of the triggering factors for oﬀending is still in its infancy. Finally, we will discuss whether this framework has substantive value to aﬀect the practices of both cybercriminals and their victims.