ABSTRACT
This chapter explains how and why greater progress eluded the President George W. Bush administration by assessing six key aspects of president's evolving strategy: how policymakers conceptualized Iran and prospects for engagement; complications arising over prioritization; difficulties associated with policy and message calibration; debilitating red lines; the impact of poor timing and the administration's apparent lack of leverage. Bush administration's Iran policy often appeared incongruous, comprising ambiguous statements about the possible use of force, high profile support for pro-democracy/anti-regime forces in Iran and an 'evolving' line on diplomatic engagement. Broadly speaking, the US was less predisposed to engagement during Bush's first term and more favourable later, while in Tehran, unhelpfully, these positions were reversed. During 2002-2003, the combination of rapid US power projection in the Middle East, accentuated by coalition-building counterterrorism activities and attention-grabbing declaratory statements, of which the 'axis of evil' speech was the most high profile, initially provoked a rather muted reaction in Tehran.
