ABSTRACT
The attitude of France in the 1912 crisis has been analysed in detail by Albertini, who adopted a highly critical attitude towards Poincare and his 'broadened interpretation' of the Franco-Russian alliance. A remarkable feature of the Franco-Russian convention is that it ignores the strategic problem which would be posed by an Austrian invasion of Serbia. In the event of Austrian action against Serbia, a rapid Russian mobilisation was unnecessary and indeed positively undesirable. All the telegrams for the Russian partial mobilisation were prepared on 22 November, but the Tsar decided that it would be as well to call a conference of his senior ministers before the orders were dispatched. In the end Nicholas II yielded reluctantly to these appeals and cancelled the proposed mobilisation. After a tense discussion with the Austrian ambassador, Count Szapary, Sazonov sent for General Janushkevich, Chief of the General Staff, and discussed plans for a partial mobilisation of the Russian army.
