ABSTRACT

It looks very much as if what is morally right, as opposed to non-morally right, is defined in terms of what one has reasons to regard as more important and thus over-riding. If what is right and moral is decided, for example, by some purely arbitrary or conventional procedure, then the demand for reasons for opting for the morally right over other kinds is not at all out of place. Now it may be objected that 'obligation' is a moral category, and that there are no non-moral obligations. Alan Gewirth has argued that the central meaning of 'being moral' when questions of the 'why be moral' type are raised, has to do with taking positive account of 'other' people's interests. This conclusion is not troublesome at all until agent morality considerations are brought in. It may be suspected that the arguments of most of moral philosophy contain an implicit recommendation that one 'should' engage in valuing and evaluating conduct.