ABSTRACT
On the matter of way in which one arrives at valuations of each type, little needs to be said about summary and calculative valuations. One must note carefully the necessity exhibited by each sort of valuation for a ground, defined as a non-arbitrary stop to reason-giving. As for affective valuation, procedures here are either unobservable, as in the case of intuitionist and moral sense claims, or else they are in the domain of psychology. The second matter concerns 'degrees' of goodness, the relative weights to be given to the various deficiencies and excellences found. Mere expressions of feeling or other affective responses are not true or false any more than the feelings themselves are true or false. But for the purposes of analysis, and thence for a rational justification procedure, it is convenient to separate the process into two 'stages', valuation, in which we simply arrive at pro or con judgments by the processes described as types of valuational act.
