ABSTRACT
To contemporary psychologists, of whom the majority define themselves as cognitivists, or at least as specialists of cognitive sciences, Burrhus Frederic Skinner's obstinate antimentalism appears as his major flaw, if not his capital sin. Skinner's antimentalism must be understood in the framework of behaviourism, and in relation to his own brand of radical behaviourism. This chapter examines that cognitivism is partly an evolution of methodological behaviourism that has emerged from progress in experimental procedures giving access to heretofore inaccessible domains. But, in another aspect, it has altogether relegated behaviour at the level of a simple expression of the deeper mental life, finally unveiled. Methodological cognitivism is perfectly in line with what has preceded it in the tradition of scientific psychology, based as it is on the use of scientific procedures to increase our understanding of a given area of reality. Epistemological cognitivism, which could be appropriately called radical cognitivism, goes one step further, an important step.
