The Commercial and Financial Condition of the French Possessions

The logic of facts is gradually bringing home to Englishmen that the French have within recent years revolutionised the commercial position of their West African possessions; of those possessions, that is, which are at present commercially exploitable. But a singular amount of ignorance continues to prevail on the subject, and in non-specialist circles the French possessions are still in a sorry condition both commercially and financially. So far is that deep-rooted idea from the truth, that not only are the French doing exceedingly well commercially in West Africa; but they are doing comparatively better than we are. Moreover, their possessions are actually costing less to manage, and economy in administration is not secured at the expense of requisite public works; quite the contrary. The days when Englishmen could represent the ideals of French Colonial management in West Africa in the light of a custom-house official and a soldier; an expenditure overlapping revenue; constant grants from the mother country; an embryonic trade and a growing budgetary deficit, have passed and gone. In some respects the French are turning the tables upon us. Even so distinguished an authority as Sir Harry Johnston falls into the popular error when he says that “ with the exception of Tunis, there is not a single French possession in Africa which is self- supporting or other than a drain upon the French exchequer.” It is a complete fallacy, and it can be proved so up to the hilt. Here and there, it is true, the old, bad, paralytic red-tape conception remains, but on the whole the French possessions north of the Bights are progressing with an astonishing rapidity; able to construct important public works out of their own surplus revenues, and to enter into railway contracts on guaranteed loans of their own raising. Miss Kingsley, in her “West African Studies,” suggested that, granting the possibility of France becoming “commercially intelligent,” she might “pocket the West African trade down to Lagos from Senegal,” and there can be no doubt that if British policy in West Africa continues to be carried out on the present lines, and if French policy in West Africa can escape the contamination of the concessionnaire régime applied with such deplorable results in French Congo, France can and will do an enormous amount of commercial damage to our possessions in West Africa, and on a fair field, in legitimate competition. Senegal, French Guinea, the Ivory Coast and Dahomey are all self-supporting, and the growth of trade in these possessions is in all conscience eloquent enough, as the following figures show :

		Senegal		Guinea		Ivory Coast		Dahomey
1889	…	£1,520,000	…	£320,000	…	£160,000	…	£360,000
1899	…	2,920,000	…	1,000,000	…	520,000	…	1,000,000
1900	…	3,189,400	…	973,000 *	…	686,300	…	1,101,084