ABSTRACT
The United States’ relationship with Taiwan was minimal at best before 1941 and ambivalent thereafter, sometimes profoundly so. Franklin Roosevelt decided in 1942 on the return of the island to the ROC in the service of an ambitious strategic vision, but disagreed with Chiang Kai-shek on the conduct of the war against Japan. In 1950, Harry Truman was willing to accept the fall of the island to the PLA and the end of the ROC. The Eisenhower administration, in turn, made Taiwan part of its strategy of China containment but also constrained Chiang’s ability to attack his old enemies. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations protected the ROC’s international interests, but found Chiang’s insular views frustrating. Anti-communist Richard Nixon told Chiang Ching-kuo he would not sell the ROC down the river and then proceeded to do just that in pursuing his opening to the PRC. Ronald Reagan was sincere in his admiration for the ROC, but then approved the August 1982 communiqué that envisioned reduced US arms sales to Taiwan. The Clinton administration made modest improvements in bilateral ties but became increasingly fearful of an inadvertent cross-Strait conflict, a risk that the 1995 to 1996 cross-Strait missile crisis made vivid. The Bush administration began as the most Taiwan-friendly government on record and ended as one of the most hostile. Taipei and Washington found it difficult to trust each other, and often for good reason.
