Taiwan and soft power

Soft power – the ability of a state to get what it seeks through normative appeal rather than coercion or side-payments – matters in cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s quest for security. Initial discussions of soft power focused on the ability of a superpower – the United States – to advance its affirmative agenda (Nye 2004, p. x). Similar notions have long been part of political thinking in the Chinese world. ¹ Soft power in the cross-Strait setting is largely a weapon of the weak (Taiwan) and serves largely defensive ends (particularly for China and also for Taiwan). In the cross-Strait context and more broadly, soft power is a relative and relational asset. For Taiwan, soft power has been a means to counter the mainland’s soft power, and its potential to do so has partly reflected China’s weaknesses in soft power. Each side has sometimes targeted the other with soft power-based measures, but much cross-Strait soft power competition has addressed third parties, including the United States. On both sides of the Strait, soft power competition – like soft power generally – is multi-faceted, including economic, foreign policy, political and cultural aspects. ² Cross-Strait soft power and soft power competition are not new. The Ma Ying-jeou, later Hu Jintao and early Xi Jinping years have brought the latest twists in a long-running story.