ABSTRACT
Theoretical behaviourism can deal with mentalistic problems like consciousness without either ignoring them, obscuring the distinction between what is inside versus what is outside the organism, or confusing what is felt with what can be measured. Theoretical behaviourism promises to provide theoretical links between behaviour and the brain that rest on real understanding, rather than on mentalist presumptions about how brain-behaviour relations must be arranged. The effect can be demonstrated experimentally with a single bright spot that is successively presented at one place and then at an adjacent place. The first is the domain of felt experience, the phenomenological domain. There is a certain quality associated with the color-phi experience. The second domain is physiological, the real-time functioning of the brain. The third domain is the domain of behavioural data, "intersubjectively verifiable" reports and judgments by experimental subjects. The reports of people in response to appropriate stimuli are the basis for everything objective we can know about color phi.
