ABSTRACT
At this point in the history of psychoanalysis, how Levenkron's article is read depends in part on whether a given analyst accepts that the movement from classical to postclassical theory is based on decades of clinical observa tion and research rather than a parochial need to supplant Freud. 1 Postclassical psychoanalysis, as clinical theory, challenges Freud's (1923)
view that human mental functioning reflects the operation of a self-con tained psyche. What is being challenged is the notion that, under optimal clinical conditions, the patient's productions are generated endogenously while the analyst works with the implied (but one-sided) interaction between the patient's psyche and the analyst's presence as a fantasy object of pro jected imagery. This latter conceptualization of the mind has led to a set of principles as to how the analyst should conduct himself, which, in tum, has been codified as "classical technique." One central principle has been that the subjective workings of the analyst's mind should remain private and, as far as possible, be used only to organize what is ultimately offered to the patient as an interpretation. There are two reasons for this injunction against the ana lyst's revelation of his or her subjective mental processes: ( 1) because such revelation is held to be an interference with the analytic process, and (2) be cause it is held to be unnecessary to the analytic process. Historically, the sec ond reason has been a relatively minor theme in classical Freudian writing because its logic has always been implied in the first reason.
