ABSTRACT
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a) is a solution concept that stems from an attempt to define the worth to each player of the prospect of having to play a given characteristic function game. As such, it represents a departure from the previous solution concepts considered in earlier chapters in that it relies on an a priori analysis of the game rather than an a posteriori analysis of a PC or set of PCs proposed as a solution of the game. In defending this different approach, Shapley (1953a) reasoned that,
At the foundation of the theory of games is the assumption that the players of a game can evaluate, in their utility scales, every ‘prospect’ that might arise as a result of the play. In attempting to apply the theory to any field, one would normally expect to be permitted to include, in the class of ‘prospects,’ the prospect of having to play a game. The possibility of evaluating games is therefore of critical importance. So long as the theory is unable to assign values to the games typically found in application, only relatively simple situations–where games do not depend on other games–will be susceptible to analysis and solution [p. 307],
