ABSTRACT
The notion of soul is fundamental to Analytical Psychology. Sometimes Jung (1931/1960) uses soul interchangeably with psyche. More frequently, however, he uses it to refer to a subpersonality: a psychological content (a) with a certain measure of autonomy, (b) in which spontaneity is inherent, and (c) which is partially unconscious (Jung, 1921/1971, par. 419). Clearly this is not the theological formulation of Christianity, but rather a matter of human experience; something more like the conception found in preliterate societies (Jung, 1927/1964, par. 84). Phenomenologist of religion, Gerardus van der Leeuw (1933/1963) sees soul as fundamental for human self-understanding: “That man represents his soul by his own image implies … that in the soul man seeks to fathom his own essence, which is concealed from him [from his ego] and yet superior to him” (vol. 1, p. 286). Soul is therefore not merely subjective, as our western prejudice might incline us to suppose. “Soul phenomena,” not at all reducible to consciousness, are “objectively real” (Jung, 1931/1960, par. 667): We can only very partially suppress our emotions and moods and cannot change them; our dreams cannot be controlled; we have ideas we cannot get out of our heads; our memory plays tricks on us; fantasies arise spontaneously; and neurotic symptoms humiliate us.
