ABSTRACT
Justice, we are reminded again and again and again, is a matter of rational principles, and if those principles or their consequences should turn out to be “callous”— as Nozick (1974) declared in his preface to Anarchy, State and Utopia-so much the worse for our feelings. It is this utter dismissal of the passions that I want to reject. I do not suggest that we in turn dismiss reason from the proceedings, but rather I argue that the distinction between reason and the passions is itself overblown and the source of much mischief. Indeed, much of what is called “reason” in philosophy is rather callousness, insensitivity, distrust of our own (or others’) sensibilities and pigheadedness in the pursuit of a proof of the obvious, and the impersonality and detachment with which we philosophers so often identify and on which we so pride ourselves may, in the instance of social philosophy, in particular, be exaggerated if not misplaced. What is essen tial to justice, I want to argue, is our supposedly unphilosophical sense of compassion and various other passions, too long swept under the carpet laid down by Kant and so many other sarcastic critics of “melting compassion” and the “inclinations.” And perhaps even more controversial, I want to argue that “negative” emotions such as indignation and vengeance are part and parcel of our human nature and equally essential to justice, not just character flaws or human weaknesses.
