ABSTRACT

In recent years the intimate connection between perception and action has been widely recognized by psychologists (e.g. von Hofsten, & Lee, 1983; Turvey & Kugler, 1984). The fact that we perceive in order to act forms the basis of a huge literature on perceptual guidance of action, including analyses of both feedback and feed-forward mechanisms in motor control (e.g., Adams, 1971; Schmidt, 1975). The fact that we act in order to perceive has been particularly acknowl­ edged most recently in the ideas of Eleanor and James Gibson, who have emphasized that perception itself is a dynamic activity and only occurs statically under the constraints of laboratory experiments. Much of the flavor of this intimate relation between perception and action is captured in Reed’s (1982) concept of an action system. He meant by this term a general class of behavior subserving some biological or practical function for an organism. He exemplified the concept with such activities as consumatory behavior, reproductive behavior, locomotion, manipulation of objects, and communication. One implication of this concept is that motor behavior has an integral organization characterized by responsiveness to certain aspects of perceptual information and directed toward a functional outcome.