ABSTRACT
The Vygotskian view of private speech should be well known to most readers of this volume. Vygotsky, unlike Piaget, did not suppose that speech directed to another was a reflection of communicative incompetence, but rather thought that it served a self-guiding function. From a Vygotskian perspective (Vygotsky, 1934/1962), private speech is functional speech first learned in social interaction but now being applied intrapersonally. It is a milestone along the developmental path to internalized speech, soon to give way to muttering and finally silent inner control via thought. Many investigators have devoted their efforts toward finding empirical evidence which would support the position that private speech is self-regulatory (e.g., Behrend, Rosengren, & Perlmutter, 1989; Frauenglass & Diaz, 1985; Goodman, 1981) and to charting the developmental course of private speech (e.g., Berk, 1986; Berk & Garvin, 1984; Frauenglass & Diaz, 1985; Fuson, 1979; Kohlberg, Yaeger, & Hjertholm, 1968; Rubin, 1979). These latter efforts have examined private speech both quantitatively and qualitatively, with one consequence of qualitative investigations being a controversy over whether private speech is uni- or multi-functional (e.g., Berk & Garvin, 1984; Diaz, 1986; Frawley & Lantolf, 1986; Fuson, 1979; Kohlberg et al., 1968). These issues are reviewed by Berk (this volume).
