ABSTRACT
Over the past years, the methods and contructs of experimental and physiological psychology have been seriously questioned by comparative psychologists, ethologists, and neuroethologists. Essentially, these criticisms have emphasized the subordination of many analyses of animal behaviour to models of human function and dysfunction, ranging from learning and motivation processes to the interpretation of CNS damage and drug treatment effects. More specifically, the charge is that of using highly “artificial” testing situations, a limited range of domesticated species (mainly rats), and inappropriate problem definitions, with little relevance for the understanding of “real world” phenomena, processes and mechanisms. This campaign often makes a liberal use of aggressive tones. It is claimed that the sacred precincts of the behavioural sciences should be promptly cleared from all sorts of obsolete paraphernalia – mazes, shuttle-boxes, Skinner-boxes, and of course the innumerable conflicting models evolved by the various psychological and neuropsychological schools.
