ABSTRACT
The end of the Cold War with the collapse, as a result of domestic pressures, of the Soviet Union (dissolved in 1991) did not lead to the ‘end of history’, or the ‘peace dividend’, foretold by some of the more superficial commentators who believed all too readily that it represented a triumph for American-led democratic capitalism, and that there would be no future clash of ideologies to destabilize the world. However, in what was a revolution in strategic affairs, the Western powers, led by the USA, were now able, despite cuts in military expenditure, to intervene more frequently around the world against states that earlier would otherwise have looked for Soviet support, not least because UN resolutions supporting such action were not vetoed in the Security Council. In addition, the established parameters within which peacekeeping was generally expected to take place, particularly that conflict had already ended, and that the government of the state in question accepted the deployment of peacekeepers, were interpreted increasingly generously, as seen with the use of terms such as peace support, peacemaking and peace enforcement. This situation, however, led to what was known as ‘mission creep’, with interventions becoming bolder in intention. ‘Mission creep’ could expose the troops involved to greater difficulties as the problems and unpredictabilities of the position on the ground became apparent.
