ABSTRACT
O ne of the most promising developments in the recent study of myth has been the emphasis placed on the ‘logic o f the concrete’. This phrase, borrowed from Levi-Strauss’s investigation of la pensee sa u v a g e refers to the tendency of ‘prim itive’ forms of classi fication — as deployed, for instance, in myths and rituals — to be articulated in terms of empirical categories (raw/cooked, wild/ tame, in the bush/in the village, etc.) and tangible things in the real world (honey, oak-trees, gold, etc.). In the present paper I take the example of one thing in the world — the wolf — to show how this sort of thinking operated in ancient Greece. In section 1 . I exam ine a variety of contexts in which wolves appear. M y aim is to demonstrate how the complex reality of the wolf tended to be pared down in the tradition to a small number of characteristics which were ‘good to think w ith ’ ,2 and how even writers of a ‘scientific’ type were influenced by features of the wolf as depicted in myth. In section 2. I use the specific example of the werewolf to indicate how Greek wolves were ‘good to think with’ in one par ticular myth-and-ritual complex; and I make some more general points about ways in which myth and ritual can be seen to com ple ment and yet to contrast with each other.
