ABSTRACT
Representation means the making present of something which is nevertheless not literally present. What I should like to say about substantive acting for others is that the represented thing or person is present in the action rather than in the characteristics of the actor, or how he is regarded, or the formal arrangements which precede or follow the action. But this locution is far from clear, and we still have the task of specifying what kind or manner of action is required here. The suggestion probably most familiar from the literature on representation is
that the representative must do what his principal would do, must act as if the principal himself were acting.1 This is a very tempting account because of its obvious proximity to the idea of making-the-represented-present, the idea of resemblance and reflection found in the descriptive view, and the idea of democratic consent associated with modern representative government. But on closer examination it entails problems. If we think of a representative acting not merely for a single principal but for an entire constituency, an unorganized set of people; then “Act as if your constituents were acting themselves” becomes a questionable slogan. If the contemplated action is voting, then presumably (but not obviously) it means that the representative must vote as a majority of his constituents would. But any activities other than voting are less easy to deal with. Is he really literally to deliberate as if he were several hundred thousand people? To bargain that way? To speak that way? And if not that way, then how? The slogan is not even right for a representative acting for a single principal;
even representing one man is not a matter of imitation. For example, I am attending a business conference as Jones’s representative, chosen to act for him there because it is a financial conference and he has no head for figures. The time comes to make a decision. I ask myself, “What would Jones do?” But the answer is clear: he would throw up his hands in horrified defeat at the sight of all those figures, and would probably make the wrong decision. Surely it is not my obligation
or role to do that for him. Imitation is not what is called for here; acting for another is not acting on the stage. But the only alternatives seem to be either that I do what Jones would want, or that I do what seems best for him, in terms of his interest. So, again, the two familiar elements of wishes and welfare seem to be the only
available choices. But these two elements form two opposed sides in a longstanding debate, undoubtedly the central classic controversy in the literature of political representation. The question at issue may be summarized as: Should (must) a representative do what his constituents want, and be bound by mandates or instructions from them; or should (must) he be free to act as seems best to him in pursuit of their welfare? This mandate-independence controversy has become encrusted with a number of other issues, partly related but partly irrelevant. It occurs mostly in contexts where political representation is at stake; so the basic question is soon entangled with such issues as the relative priority of local versus national interest, the role of political parties, and the nature of political questions. It tends to be complicated also by the differences between representing a single principal and representing a diverse political constituency. Still, the underlying conceptual problem is worth isolating and examining in its own right. What I shall argue about this conceptual dispute is, first, that the way in which it is usually formulated makes a consistent answer impossible; second, that the meaning of representation nevertheless supplies a consistent position about a representative’s duties; and, third, that this consistent position only sets outer limits, within which there remains room for a wide range of views on how a political representative should act or what distinguishes good from bad representing. A writer’s position in this range of views is correlated with his conception of political life in the broadest sense: his ideas on the nature of political issues, the relative capacities of rulers and ruled, the nature of man and society-in short, what we might call his metapolitics. A number of positions have at one time or another been defended, between the
two poles of mandate and independence. A highly restrictive mandate theorist might maintain that true representation occurs only when the representative acts on explicit instructions from his constituents, that any exercise of discretion is a deviation from this ideal. A more moderate position might be that he may exercise some discretion, but must consult his constituents before doing anything new or controversial, and then do as they wish or resign his post. A still less extreme position might be that the representative may act as he thinks his constituents would want, unless or until he receives instructions from them, and then he must obey. Very close to the independence position would be the argument that the representative must do as he thinks best, except insofar as he is bound by campaign promises or an election platform. At the other extreme is the idea of complete independence, that constituents have no right even to exact campaign promises; once a man is elected he must be completely free to use his own judgment. But whatever his precise position, a theorist is likely to invoke the appropriate
analogies and adverbial expressions to defend it. A mandate theorist will see the representative as a “mere” agent, a servant, a delegate, a subordinate substitute for
those who sent him. The representative, he will say, is “sent as a servant,” not “chosen with dictatorial powers,” and so the purpose which sent him must have been the constituents’ purpose and not his own.2 They sent him to do something for them which they might have chosen to do for themselves, which they are perfectly capable of doing and understanding.3 Hence the representative was sent to pursue his constituents’ will and not his own. Other mandate theorists invoke the metaphors of descriptive representation, seeing the representative as a mechanical device through which his constituents act-a mirror or megaphone. As to the national interest, the mandate theorist is likely to argue that the sum of local constituencies is the nation, and the sum of constituency interests is the national interest. Besides, if each representative was not intended to act as an agent of his locality, why was he locally elected?4
