ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that historical or psychological explanations obviously do not conform to the deductive pattern for patent lack of the appropriate lawlike premises. The deductive pattern is not restricted to cases where the lawlike premise is a generalized conditional formed of explicit antecedent condition statements and explanandum. The chapter focuses on cases where the initial conditions are left unstated, though the explanation formulates the relevant law-like traits of individuals. It explains Khrushchev's behavior by giving an account of what he is after, by stating the factors he takes into consideration in making his decisions, by discovering the rules by which he evaluates his own and others' conduct. Gilbert Ryle stresses the incompleteness of motive-descriptions as explanations, in that they require reference to what he calls 'causes', which, when supplied, yield deductive accounts. Ryle seems not to be proposing an alternative to the complete deductive pattern but rather to be pointing out a special sort of incomplete explanation.
