The Conception of Reality
Here, it will be seen, Mr. Bradley states that, in his opinion, Time, z'n a certaz'n character, neither has nor belongs to reality; this is the conclusion he wishes to maintain. And to say that Time has not reality would seem to be plainly equivalent to saying that Time £$ not real. However, if anybody should doubt whether the two phrases are meant to be equivalent, the doubt may be easily set at rest by a reference to the concluding words of the same chapter, where Mr. Bradley uses the following very emphatic expression: "Time," he says, "like space, has most evidently proved not to be rea!, but to be a contradictory appearance" (p. 43). Mr. Bradley does, then, say here, in so many words, that Time is not real. But there is one other difference between this statement at the end of the chapter, and the statement at the beginning of it,
which we must not forget to notice. In the statement at the beginning he carefully qualifies the assertion "Time neither has nor belongs to reality" by saying" Time, z'n the character which z't exhibits, neither has nor belongs to reality," whereas in the final statement this qualification is not inserted; here he says simply "Time is not real." This qualification, which is inserted in the one place and omitted in the other, might, of course. be meant to imply that, in some other character-some character which it does not exhibit-Time has reality and does belong to it. And I shall presently have something to say about this distinction between Time in one character and Time in another, because it might be thought that this distinction is the explanation of the difficulty as to Mr. Bradley's meaning, which I am going to point out.