The Conception of Intrinsic Value
My main object in this paper is to try to define more precisely the most important question, which, so far as I can see, is really at issue when it is disputed with regard to any predicate of value. whether it is or is not a II subjective" predicate. There are three chief cases in which this controversy is apt to arise. It arises, first, with regard to the -conceptions of "right" and " wrong." and the closely allied conception of II duty" or " what ought to be done." It arises, secondly. with regard to " good" and" evil," in some sense of those words in which the conceptions for which they stand are certainly quite distinct from the conceptions of .. right" and "wrong," but in which nevertheless it is undeniable that ethics has to deal with them. And it arises, lastly, with regard to certain (esthetic conceptions, such as "beautiful" and "ugly;" or " good" and "bad," in the sense in which these words are applied to works of art, and in which, therefore, the question what is good and bad is a question not for ethics but for (esthetics.