chapter  III
50 Pages

William James’ “Pragmatism”

The conviction that goodness and beauty are intrinsic kinds of value, which is, according to the author, the strongest ground of their objection to any subjective view. Though, from the proposition that a particular kind of value is "intrinsic" it does follow that it must be "objective", the converse implication by no means holds, but on the contrary it is perfectly easy to conceive theories of such as, "goodness", according to which goodness would, in the strictest sense, be "objective", and yet would not be "intrinsic". Many of those who hold strongly (as many do) that all kinds of value are "subjective" certainly object to the so-called "objective" view, not so much because it is objective, as because it is not naturalistic or positivistic: a characteristic which does naturally follow from the contention that value is "intrinsic", but does not follow from the mere contention that it is "objective".