ABSTRACT
The contention that all moral concepts, which are used as predicates in moral judgments, are ultimately based on emotions, is of course a claim that has to be substantiated. Professor McDougall has criticized the scheme both in point of terminology and classification. He has raised the objection that approval and disapproval are not emotions but judgments, and that to describe them as emotions is to perpetuate the chaos of psychological terminology. According to Steinmetz, revenge is rooted in the feeling of power and superiority. It arises consequent on the experience of injury, and its aim is to enhance the self-feeling, which has been lowered or degraded by the injury suffered. As there are varieties of non-moral resentment so there are also varieties of moral disapproval. Under the influence of the altruistic sentiment its aggressiveness has been subject to modifications. At its earlier stages the desire to cause suffering or destruction to the offender is a very marked characteristic of it.
