ABSTRACT
Nonprovocative defense (NPD) is a concept born of frustration with a Western defense that was costly, yet weak, destabilizing, and overly reliant on nuclear weapons. NPD seemingly offered an alternative. NPD began as an attrition and linear scheme of war dependent upon emerging technology for sensing targets and delivering firepower. This chapter argues that NPD has been inappropriate. In the new context of a united Germany, NPD does have its attractions in reassuring neighbors all around. But the question of its military utility for the defense of Germany remains. Parity in equipment and manpower for NATO and the former Warsaw Pact as a whole does not equate to military equality where it counts the most, on the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis. Militarily, defensive primacy has been Europe’s curse. Clausewitz railed against the bloodless wars of maneuver, those stale chessboard wars of the monarchs conducted by trained professionals.
