ABSTRACT
Viewed from the vantage point of cognitive models of psychopathology, the concept of cognitive interference has been defined through both clinical and experimental avenues. Starting with a description of symptoms, the magnitude of interference phenomena has been an oft used yardstick for determining whether changes in mental functioning reported by patients are transitory or sufficiently severe to warrant a clinical diagnosis. This is implicitly acknowledged by the inclusion of such features as recurrent ideation (suicidal or guilt) or diminished ability to think or concentrate in formal diagnostic criteria for various psychiatric disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1995, DSM-IV). From the perspective of cognitive science, interference phenomena are bona fide experimental findings that have contributed to development of models of knowledge representation in normal populations, and allowed for more recent extensions of this work to pathological groups (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). This chapter examines the mutual influence of these two domains in current notions of cognitive interference in depression and anxiety.
