ABSTRACT
This chapter describes how some irrigation engineers raise vast amounts of illicit revenue from the distribution of water and contracts, and redistribute part to superior officers and politicians. It argues that the corruption 'system', which is centred on control of personnel transfers, is an important supply-side reason for poor performance of canal-irrigated agriculture. Insofar as the same system operates in other government departments, it may be more important for understanding Indian politics and the political influences on economic development than has previously been realised. It is clear, then, that the pressures on any one individual to behave in a 'corrupt' manner, whether in response to demands from superiors in the irrigation hierarchy or to satisfy the expectations of politicians and farmers, are very strong. In south Indian state, paddy is the main irrigated crop, followed by groundnut, hybrid sorghum and cotton. Almost all of the canal-irrigated area is fed from systems constructed, operated and maintained by the state Irrigation Department.
