ABSTRACT

constituency between elections. In our area it is said that a man needs to have at minimum one lakh rupees available before it is worth even thinking about contesting an MLA’s seat (except perhaps in the case of seats reserved for a Scheduled Caste candidate). Votes are commonly purchased, especially from Low Caste and Scheduled Caste voters (voting within the politically dominant but numerically inferior castes is more likely to follow factional alignments). In the local government elections o f 1981, a serious candidate even for village headship (sarpanch) would have to reckon on spending something o f the order o f Rs.30-50,000 in an average-sized village, if the election was contested.53 And Ministers may have to pay the Chief Minister to get the portfolio they want (which is perhaps part o f the reason for the expansion in ministerial portfolios). Money is not the only requirement, o f course; favours for supporters must be obtained from the bureaiicracy too, but there is no doubt that the rupee price of successful politics is Very high.Politicians have been able to make use o f the bureaucracy to help meet the costs o f electoral competition. We have seen how they do so in the case o f Irrigation; and one would expect that Irrigation would be an especially valuable department to control, not only because it spends big money but also because its decisions greatly affect the political prospects o f politicians and the economic prosperity o f local communities. However, it is clear (though I shall not go into the matter here) that similar mechanisms operate in other government departments as well, including such apparently ‘clean’ ones as Agriculture and Labour Welfare.The transfer is the politicians’ basic weapon o f control over the bureauc­racy, and thus the lever for surplus-extraction from the clients o f the bureaucracy. With the transfer weapon not only can the politicians raise money by direct sale; they can also remove someone who is not being responsive enough to their monetary demands or to their requests for favours to those from whom they get money and electoral support-in particular, contractors. One is thus led to visualise a special circuit o f transactions, in which the bureaucracy acquires control o f funds, partly (in this case) from farmers in the form o f variable levies, and partly from the state’s public works budget, then passes a portion to MLAs and especially Ministers, who in turn use the funds for distributing short-term material inducements in exchange for electoral support. These funds, it should be noticed, do flow through the public domain (in one sense); but they are neither open to public scrutiny nor available for public expenditure programmes [Wade, forthcoming].This ‘transfer model’, with its systematic linkage between top-level and bottom-level corruption and between administrative and political cor­ruption, is, I think, quite plausible once spelled out. One wonders whether the processes it describes are not more common in poor countries than its absence from the political science literature would suggest.54 POLICY RESPONSES In the specific context o f canal O & M, what should reformers press government to do to improve the situation? One line o f solution which