ABSTRACT
The policy, the personality and the money of T. E. Lawrence exercised a decisive influence upon the future of Iraq. Lawrence and his school of thought wanted independence pur sang for the Arabs. Others, no less competent judges, emphasized that any new Arab states that might come into existence, whether independent or not, must possess economic unity and therefore must be given scientific frontiers. From 1917 onwards the two ideas came into even sharper opposition; for a time in 1919–20, when the air was full of Woodrow Wilson, it seemed as if Lawrence’s main preoccupation was to find thrones for his Sharifian allies, the sons of King Hussain. But by that time the diplomatic machine—aided by the Realpolitik of Clemenceau—was regaining control of the situation, and the Middle East, which to Lawrence was the be-all and the end-all, resumed its place and relative importance, as a pawn in the bigger game.
