ABSTRACT
The two major traditions in philosophy, empiricism and rationalism, are, in Hans Reichenbach's words, ‘as old as the history of philosophy’, but their rival claims have not yet been adjudicated in a manner acceptable to all knowledgeable philosophers, nor is there any prospect of this being effected by any of the procedures available to philosophers. About the history of philosophy itself, Reichenbach has raised a serious and troubling question: he said, ‘… this story of ever renewed attempts—what is it good for? Why should we teach it if there is no outcome, no recognized truth?’ 1 In connection with this question he gave expression to a complaint which a good many scientists and thoughtful laymen have made and which deserves more than the casual notice it has received from philosophers: ‘The sciences have developed a general body of knowledge, carried by universal recognition, and he who teaches a science does so with the proud feeling of introducing his students into a realm of well-established truth… . Imagine a scientist who were to teach electronics in the form of a report on the views of different physicists, never telling his students what are the laws governing electronics… . Why must the philosopher forego a generally accepted philosophy?’ 2 The contrast between the progress of the sciences and the poverty of philosophy is so striking as to cry out for an explanation, an explanation which will tell us why the philosopher can never reach what he constantly strives for, why, to use Kant's phrase, his ‘Sisyphian stone’ can never be brought securely to rest at the top. In this essay the primary purpose will be to throw light on the question as to why philosophers have had to forego a generally accepted resolution of the controversy between empiricism and rationalism, that is, what it is in the very nature of the controversy that makes permanent irresolution possible.
