ABSTRACT
In seeking to vindicate the a priori validity of the principle of substance, Kant begins by putting forward a proposition which has every appearance of being on precisely the same footing as a proposition about matters of fact, he then goes on to establish that the feature of fact stated in the proposition must be exhibited by every object of sense-experience. The essential difference between what might be called subjective time and objective time is brought out by Kant. In dealing with the problem which presents itself in this context, Kant propounds a rather obscure and complicated argument. Within the framework of an epistemological enquiry he has no right to concern himself with a question bearing upon the psychology of sense-perception, secondly, the account he actually gives is wholly lacking in plausibility. Kant's observations upon substantia phenomenon show quite clearly how radically his view of substance differs from the metaphysical view, and how well aware he is of this distinction.
