ABSTRACT
The philosophy of science has been one of the last bastions of foundationalism. In general, foundationalist programs in the philosophy of science have been maintained by overlooking the significance of experimentation—or the planning, executing, and interpreting of actions—the implications of which are profoundly antifoundational. A phenomenological and hermeneutical philosophy of science might not only solve many traditional problems, but also answer the challenge posed by certain historians to broaden the language of the philosophy of science." Foundationalist programs in the philosophy of science have been beset by numerous recurring difficulties, both scientific and philosophical. Martin Heidegger's "existential conception of science" is nonfoundational, for it envisages scientific entities and observations as products of a prior engagement of Dasein with the world; a scientist never confronts an entity or makes an observation purely and simply, but through a process of making-present.
