ABSTRACT
One reason why political power has been concentrated in the presidency in Latin America is that presidentialism has long been interpreted by elites as a strong source of leadership over fractious societies that simultaneously embodies the idea of the ‘state’ (see Box 2.1), as opposed to being one component in a more complex separation of powers developed to avoid tyranny, as in the US. Some of the most successful presidents in Latin American history have been authoritarian centralists who resisted demands for checks and balances on their power. For this reason, Latin American executives comprising a president overseeing cabinet ministers have different relationships with legislatures and enjoy great influence over them. O’Donnell’s notion of ‘delegative democracy’ (see Chapters 3, 4) characterised a type of exaggerated presidentialism, sometimes referred to as hyper-presidentialism, that is found in systems that are nominally democratic. However, there have been many clashes between different political actors in Latin America deriving from their different interpretations of the executive’s role and powers. A key theme underlying literature on presidentialism since the 1990s has been how well it serves democratic stability (see Mainwaring, 1990). Philip (2003) argues that an important explanatory factor behind democratic non-consolidation is that Latin American
The voters decide – Brazil’s 1993 referendum
In Brazil, a growing theme of debate after the transition of 1985 was about how to root democratic procedures in stable institutions. The Assembléia Nacional Constituinte (ANC, National Constituent Assembly), comprising both houses of congress, was convened in 1987-88 to rewrite the country’s constitution. After first opting for a parliamentary system of government based on a mixed parliamentary-presidential model similar to that of Portugal, the ANC then backpedalled in favour of a presidential system, but one which was enhanced by giving the executive formidable temporary decree powers. Fierce disagreements between supporters of the presidential and parliamentary models were only resolved through a compromise by which it was agreed the issue and other momentous questions about the preferred form of government would be put to a referendum in 1993. Supporters and opponents of both options engaged the Brazilian public in this unique institutional debate through the press and on television in the run-up to the plebiscite, which the presidentialist forces won with 55 per cent of the vote against 25 per cent for those advocating a parliamentary system. The clear vote in favour of presidentialism came despite its poor record in Brazil in the years prior to the poll. Fernando Collor de Mello, Brazil’s president from 1990 to 1992, was a political outsider who marginalised established parties, abused his decree powers to undertake draconian policies unilaterally without consulting congress, and was eventually impeached on corruption charges, although he was later declared not guilty of the allegations made against him. In 1991, Collor even intervened during senate deliberations to ratify the date of the referendum, thereby delaying the vote by a year, because he feared the 1992 date originally set would further damage his by then failing administration.
