ABSTRACT
In 1946 and 1947 a tolerable configuration of power in Eurasia probably could not have been brought about without provoking the Soviets. The threats emanating from the post-war socio-economic dislocation and power vacuum were too great to allow for a policy of reassurance. Although unlikely, a sequence of events might have ended in Communist victories in France, Italy, and Greece, and might have led to an autonomous and revanchist Germany, and might have culminated in Soviet domination, however indirect, of major parts of western Eurasia. Prudent men could not take such risks when the leadership in the Kremlin was so totalitarian and repressive and when it possessed an ideology that appeared attractive to even larger numbers of people in the underdeveloped periphery. US officials intelligently decided to rebuild western Europe and to co-opt German and Japanese strength. These actions were of decisive importance in fueling the Cold War, but they were prudently conceived and skillfully implemented in cooperation with indigenous elites.
