ABSTRACT
The notion of being involved in war about a Balkan quarrel was repugnant . . . there was no sentiment urging us to go into a war on Serbia’s behalf. If France were involved, it would not be in any quarrel in which we owed her good-will. . . . It would indeed not be in any quarrel of her own at all; it would be because she, as Russia’s Ally, had the misfortune to be involved in a Russian quarrel. . . . What, it was asked, was the good of keeping so carefully clear of alliances and obligations if we were to be drawn into European war in such a quarrel as this? . . . Some of us felt that the considerations stated above did not touch the true issue. We felt that to stand aside would mean the domination of Germany; the subordination of France and Russia; the isolation of Britain, the hatred of her by both those who had feared and those who had wished for her intervention in the war; and ultimately that Germany would wield the whole power of the Continent. How would she use it as regards Britain? Could anyone feel comfortable about that question? Could anyone give to it truthfully in his heart any but a sinister and foreboding answer?
