ABSTRACT
The end of soviet socialism heralded a different political and economic environment for the mass media. The late 1980s and early 1990s were heady days, while censorship had not entirely disappeared, a freewheeling pluralism developed as all shades of opinion were published and, to a lesser extent, broadcast. The new freedoms and media privatisation also brought new, harsher economic realities, including the loss or reduction of state subsidies and falling subscriptions. The oligarchs bought media outlets in the mid-1990s to ensure Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996 and, while this money was a financial lifeline for some publications, the new proprietors’ intervention in editorial policies led to clashes with journalists. Media freedom, subject to the usual restrictions found in most democracies against, for example, inciting hatred or revealing state secrets, is guaranteed by the RF Constitution. There are also NGOs such as the Glasnost Defence Fund and the Russian Union of Journalists and its Centre for Journalists in Extreme Situations, which champion media freedom. Although formal government censorship is much less restrictive than in the USSR, informal means to control information or to encourage self-censorship have grown. The state, corrupt politicians, business and criminals all, at times, want to prevent the investigation and reporting of their activities. Putin’s commitment to a ‘managed democracy’ included channelling public debate within tightly defined parameters and managing information flows. Putin sought to achieve this through a combination of support from pro-Kremlin media proprietors and more decisively by bringing Russia’s national media into the ownership of government-controlled energy companies. Putin also responded
to the development of the new information technologies by targeting cyberspace for state control.
