ABSTRACT
After the Anglo-American withdrawal from the Aswan dam venture, Nasser was probably left without any secure means of financing his scheme to bring Egypt into the modern age. Lloyd warned Ben-Gurion of the dangers inherent in this sort of military operation: the uniting for peace procedure could be invoked in the General Assembly to override the British and French vetoes; the American attitude was uncertain; Canada would probably oppose what had happened. The military operation might have to be stopped after a few days. The British Foreign Secretary tried to make it clear that an agreement between Israel, France and Britain to attack Egypt was impossible. Members of successive American administrations have publicly regretted Dwight D. Eisenhower's 'humiliation' of Britain and France: Henry Kissinger has argued that it forced the United States to take over Britain and France's burdens. It was that country which forced Britain and France to stop, and effectively secured Israel's rights to the Straits of Tiran.
