ABSTRACT
Perhaps in no other sector has the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev been criticized so severely as the economy. The reason perhaps is that he was dealing with an area about which he knew little, but in which he became deeply enmeshed. In short, he seemed unwilling to delegate major decisions to experts. According to an American economist, ‘Gorbachev did not understand the basic economic principles of the reforms he sought to introduce’ (Tedstrom, 1991, p. 12). The period of Perestroika is replete with attempts to improve the performance of the Soviet economy, of frank assessments of hitherto concealed problems, and ultimately of the frustration felt by many economists at the limited reforms that were actually implemented. Arguably, Gorbachev considered the economy as the most critical factor for his administration, sacrificing any foreign policy ambitions in order that he might give it undivided attention. Perestroika, first and foremost, signified economic restructuring. For our purposes, the failure of economic reform demonstrates the limitations of the Gorbachev leadership, but one still needs to assess to what degree the economic crisis that was evident by 1991 was a key factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union.
