ABSTRACT

The history of Germany after 1648 tends to be treated as chapter one of the ‘rise of Prussia’. Probably we should hear less of the Great Elector if he had not been the forerunner of Frederick the Great and Bismarck; but it cannot be denied that Brandenburg was made into a successful state out of material that would have been unpromising even without the various ill-effects of the war. At this stage Brandenburg and its associated territories seemed less likely to achieve prosperity for its people and power for its rulers than either Bavaria or Saxony. Maximilian of Bavaria had already, by the time of his death in 1651, encouraged cautious rehabilitation, re-settling land that had gone out of cultivation, disbanding the army rapidly, importing horses and cattle to make good some of the wartime losses. His son Ferdinand Maria seemed to have good prospects of establishing an absolutism as secure as any in Europe. The Wittelsbach dynasty were the only serious rivals to the Habsburgs, and became eventually the longest-lasting of all ruling houses – from the twelfth century to the twentieth. They had remained firmly attached to the Catholic cause, and could reasonably claim to have done more than the Habsburgs to turn back the advance of Protestantism without having allowed the numerous clergy to gain much political power. Bavaria, on the other hand, had not much opportunity of economic progress. Cut off from the sea, and with no long-distance river transport, its only commerce was by land; and though Munich was a junction of alpine routes it had not become a major city. Nor was there a body of powerful magnates to whom the Wittelsbachs could tarn in the formation of an impressive court, or whose quarrels they could exploit. Landed estates were seldom large; peasants were not, by German standards, unduly oppressed – and indeed were able after 1648 to benefit from a shortage of labour; the armies that had flourished during the war did not become a permanent source of support for the government or for landed families. Ferdinand Maria handled his political problems well. Evading pressure to permit regular meetings of the Estates, he developed the small self-perpetuating committee of ‘deputies’ that took over the function of granting taxes and petitioning for redress of grievances. A conciliar system of government was soon working efficiently enough, with the usual assortment of specialized councils and local commissaries. Revenue rose, and an active Chancellor, Caspar von Schmid, showed some enthusiasm for reviving the textile and mining industries and encouraging agricultural improvements. But there was no attempt to organise the state for war until the arrival in 1679 of an Elector with dynastic and military ambitions. Maximilian Emmanuel was soon able to claim credit for rescuing the emperor from the Turks at the siege of Vienna; but he then reverted to the alliance with France that proved disastrous in the Spanish Succession War. Bavaria suffered the unexpected punishment of being occupied by Austrian armies. But it was not annexed: the momentary possibility that would have made the Austrian Empire into more of a German state than an eastern one would not have been welcome to the allies at Utrecht.