ABSTRACT
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Habsburg Austria had been the principal European opponent of the Ottoman empire, at first on the defensive as the main barrier to the progress of Ottoman arms into central Europe and latterly on the offensive. At the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) Austria wrested substantial territories from Ottoman control and made even greater gains at Passarowitz (1718). During the remainder of the eighteenth century Austria was unable to sustain this offensive because of her preoccupation with the threat from Prussia in central Europe. The gains ofPassarowitz were lost at Belgrade (1739); Austria took no part in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-74 (although she took advantage of Ottoman helplessness in 1774 to seize the Bukovina); and she was dragged reluctantly into the Russo-Ottoman War of 1787-92 on the coat-tails of Russia and withdrew prematurely in 1791 (Treaty of Sistova) gaining only the Banat as compensation for her meagre efforts. By this time Austria had come to fear the growing threat from Russia in the Balkans, but could do little to oppose Russia lest she should drive that power into the arms of Prussia; instead Austria was obliged to endure an uneasy co-operation with Russia, even including a vague plan in 1782 to partition the European provinces of the Ottoman empire between the two powers. Nevertheless, it was plain that the Ottoman Balkans would become a major area of competition between Austria and Russia in the future.
