ABSTRACT
A point of no return came for the Turks in September, the Russians in November and the British and French in December. Buol still dreamt of bringing the Russians and Turks to the negotiating table, but both camps were planning offensives, and the French and British were contemplating the mechanics of rupture. In contrast, English maritime supremacy and public support of vigorous action fostered Graham's forward strategy and London's political leadership in projecting offensives, even if British war plans were still more inchoate than real. The irony of the entry of combined squadrons into the Black Sea is that they did not thereby attain real control as per instructions. Instead the British and French simply escorted Turkish reinforcements to Batum and then returned to the Bosphorus at the end of January. The only real 'bearding' of the Russians was the delivery of Dundas's and Hamelin's notes to Menshikov, an obvious by product being some systematic reconnaissance of Sevastopol's defences.
