ABSTRACT
W hen war broke out in 1914, and for some months afterwards, the British governm ent assumed that fighting Germany was compatible w ith (in the words o f Churchill) ‘business as usual’. Britain’s small expeditionary force w ould supple m ent the m uch larger French army and we w ould supply them and our other Allies w ith financial and material aid in what, it was confidently expected, w ould be a short campaign similar to the Franco-Germ an conflict o f 1870. By the end o f 1915 these assumptions had been overturned. A mass army now had to be organ ised and the nation had to accept the prospect o f a long, exhausting war and the mobilisation o f all available material resources in order to survive. U nder the strain, the market econom y failed to deliver the goods and it was soon recognised that the state had to extend its authority to a degree unimagined in peace-time. C en tral allocation o f resources and price fixing began w ith m unitions and were then extended further and further into the economy to ensure adequate war supplies and a proper division o f output betw een military and civilian needs. By 1918 two-thirds o f the economy and nine-tenths o f imports were subject to direction by bodies authorised by governm ent.1
