ABSTRACT

All wars th rea ten the political stability o f belligerents. They test the com petence o f governm ents. They dem and sacrifices from citizens, w hich have to be justified an d rew arded. They arouse extrem e em o­ tions. They d isrup t econom ic an d social life. U nless they can be lim ited in d u ra tion an d intensity, the effects becom e acute, an d the political consequences potentially revolutionary. These consequences are, o f course, hugely aggravated by defeat. T he Franco-G erm an war o f 1870-71, unlike the E uropean wars fough t over the previous two decades in the Crim ea, Italy, D enm ark and G erm any, quickly overflowed the limits o f d ip lom atic an d political calculation. T he expectations o f the statesm en an d generals who began it proved false, an d the dynam ic forces un leashed by the war - as they real­ ized to the ir alarm - slipped ou t o f the ir grasp. ‘T he war takes on an ever m ore hateful character,’ wrote the Prussian G eneral von Moltke on 27 O ctober. ‘It is bad enough th a t arm ies m ust slaughter each o ther; one m ust n o t lead w hole peoples against each o th e r .’1