ABSTRACT
From at least the time of the ancient Greeks onwards political phil osophers have debated about what it is that makes government rightful or legitimate, and what criteria have to be met if those subject to political authority are to have an obligation to obey it (Pateman, 1985; Horton, 1992). ‘The strongest is never strong enough to be master,’ wrote Rousseau, ‘unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty’ (Rousseau, 1963: 6). But what exactly is it that creates ‘right’ and ‘duty’? Philosophi cal arguments in Western political theory about this key issue have rarely been a merely academic matter; they have usually been symptomatic of some profound dilemma or crisis of political order, and have reflected much wider debates and disagreements about its legitimacy within society itself. The rich tradition of normative political theorising, in other words, which we read now as a selfcontained academic exercise, should properly be seen as a mirror for real and live political debate about the grounds, the forms and the limits of governmental authority in different historical periods.
